Tuesday, 26 April 2011

Edwin Van Der Sar




  • What You Need To Know
  • Goalkeepers before van der Sar tended to be lumbering and single-purpose.
  • Van der Sar changed the game by effectively becoming an 11th outfield player.
  • The real lesson in van der Sar's retirement is to go out on top.
"As a boy, he never expected to play professional football."
One April afternoon in 1991, Ajax Amsterdam’s goalkeeper, Stanley Menzo, limped off injured. When his replacement bounded on, you wanted to laugh. The 20-year-old Edwin van der Sar was big-eared, rail thin and dressed entirely in purple with tiny shorts. By way of warming up, he literally skipped around the penalty area. He looked like a particularly camp gymnast. Then he began to keep. Twenty years on, as Manchester United’s keeper prepares to retire next month, he has redefined his profession.

From Caveman To Superman            

The pre-Sarian goalkeeper -- still found in some primitive regions of Britain -- was a hulking bear who kept goal because he couldn’t play football. He could barely kick a ball straight. He was applauded for spectacular saves. He proved the adage that "goalkeepers are crazy." He had a longer career than outfield players, but still generally quit in his midthirties before he began to look silly.Managers rarely noticed him unless he let a ball through his legs. But van der Sar changed our expectations of goalkeepers.
               
I’ve followed him all his career. We’re a year apart in age and grew up within five miles of each other in the Netherlands. He looks just like the villagers we used to play against on windy Saturdays by the North Sea. At 6'5", he is around average height for the region, and his long, pale, gloomy face -- that of a Calvinist pastor circa 1872 -- is typical too. 
              
As a boy, he never expected to play professional football. However, in 1988, Ajax summoned him for a trial match with its second team. The stadium was empty except for a gaggle of his friends who held up a banner that read, "van der Sar in Oranje." He would play a record 130 matches for the Oranje, Holland’s national team. 
              
It soon turned out that he was the keeper that Holland had been looking for since the 1960s. When Johan Cruyff and Rinus Michels first dreamed up Dutch "total football," Cruyff had a vision of the perfect goalkeeper: an outfield player in gloves. It had always bothered Cruyff that keepers just stopped shots. It was a waste of a player, Cruyff thought. He wanted a keeper who could play football. Wouldn’t it be perfect, he mused, if you could combine with 11 men rather than 10, and it just happened that one of them could save a ball when necessary?
                 
Van der Sar was that keeper -- total football’s missing link. Two-footed, adept at the one-touch pass, he could have been a professional outfield player and perhaps more than that. During the 1994 World Cup, he played in outfield during Holland’s training sessions in Florida and looked like one of its better performers. Cruyff called him “Ajax’s best attacker.” 

Rewriting The Book            

But he was a new model keeper in other ways too. Traditionally, keepers were praised for their saves. Van der Sar tried not to make saves. He organized his defense so that he wouldn’t need to make them. Every save meant that something had gone wrong beforehand. He positioned himself so astutely that strikers often shot straight at him. You rarely noticed him -- he was a boring keeper -- but he rarely conceded goals either. And when he had to save, he did.


He also had the perfect keeper’s temperament. The Dutch call him an ijs konijn, an “ice rabbit.” This goalkeeper isn’t crazy. He says: "I sometimes see nice, quiet boys go nuts on the pitch. Then I think, people can say I’m a 'dead one,' but I don’t think those guys are 100 percent." Van der Sar rebuffs the emotion around him with a chilled irony that usually falls short of being funny. 
           
Lastly, there was his shape: perfect for modern football. The big, burly English keeper, who could push his way through a crowded penalty area to a cross (think Arsenal’s David Seaman), was becoming extinct by the 1990s. Even in England, referees were no longer letting forwards push and foul anymore. In the new, genteel game, Seamans were redundant. The new model keeper had to be a giant gymnast -- a rare phenomenon. Van der Sar is it.
             
By age 24, he was Holland’s automatic No. 1 and had won the Champions League with Ajax in 1995. In 1999, he joined Juventus. The story goes that as he waited in Amsterdam airport to fly to Italy to sign, his phone rang. It was Alex Ferguson. Did van der Sar fancy joining Manchester United, one of football's biggest brand? The keeper apologized; he’d already said yes to Juventus. For years afterward, as United kept signing substandard keepers, Ferguson would regret having called van der Sar a day late. 
  
Van der Sar probably regretted it too. At Juventus, for the only time in his career, he lost confidence and committed what the Italians called papere -- keeper’s errors. Juventus had his eyes tested. In 2001, it dispatched him to the west London neighborhood club Fulham.

A Downward Trend           

In Dublin on September 1, 2001, I witnessed van der Sar’s nadir. Holland lost to Ireland and missed qualifying for the 2002 World Cup. Afterward, the keeper strode off in what, by his standards, was a state of emotion. He passed a small table that stood beside the field. It looked doomed. He lifted a long leg to administer the coup de grace. But then, instead of shattering the table, he lifted his leg an inch higher and merely flicked a plastic cup off the tabletop. That was van der Sar: the ice rabbit with perfect footwork.
        
But his best seemed past. The former world’s greatest goalkeeper spent four years at Fulham. Meanwhile, Manchester United and Arsenal soldiered on with substandard keepers. Whereas in Holland, a keeper was expected to be an outfield player, and in Italy, an infallible shot-stopper, in England, little seemed expected of him at all. Most managers undervalue and misunderstand goalkeepers. When the sports economist Bernd Frick studied salaries in Germany’s Bundesliga, he found that keepers earned less than outfield players, despite mostly being older. Perhaps the main reason is managerial ignorance: Even great managers like Ferguson or Arsene Wenger view keeping as an alien craft, like flower arranging. Barely understanding what keepers do, they are loath to pay much for them.
        
Finally, in 2005, Ferguson gambled just under $4 million on van der Sar. The keeper was surprised. At 34, well past the optimal age for most players, he had thought his career was winding down. He was looking forward to returning to his amateur club and playing center forward. "Scoring goals is the most fun," he said.



In fact, his career was restarting. At United he won three straight league titles, and early one morning in Moscow in 2008, the invisible keeper finally became the hero. The Champions League final between United and Chelsea went to a penalty shootouts. Van der Sar had a bad record in shootouts, and Chelsea had spotted his fatal flaw: On penalties, he dived too often to his right. Chelsea’s first six kickers shot to his left. He didn’t save a kick. In fact, by this point, he’d deserved to lose the shootout. However, John Terry’s famous slip saved United. 
            
Then, after six penalties, van der Sar grasped what was happening. Just before Nicolas Anelka took Chelsea’s seventh, the keeper pointed to his own left. (Here, prose as a medium fails. I urge you to watch the shootout on YouTube.) “That’s where you’re all putting it,” he was saying. Anelka froze: He’d been found out. Terrified, he patted a gentle shot to the keeper’s right. Van der Sar, smiling as he dived, stopped it. "That one, all-decisive save is yet to come," he had said years before. Here it was. 
             
In these final years, van der Sar has kept expecting to decay. Surely his eyesight must be going? It wasn’t. "Everybody doubts themselves," he said recently. "Every writer doubts themselves, every artist doubts himself and every football player does. That is what certain players thrive on.”   

Going Out On Top            

By peaking so late, he has helped change the conventional wisdom about goalkeepers' careers. Football’s ideal is old heads on young legs, but that’s particularly true for keepers. Joop Hiele, van der Sar’s former keeping coach, once explained: "Goalkeeping is registering the situation, recognizing it and finding the solution. The more often you do it, the easier it gets." An older keeper decodes the structure of attacks so quickly that he has time to organize his defense. Younger keepers can’t. They have only their talent. And when they make mistakes, they start doubting themselves. That’s what happened to United’s American, Tim Howard, the club’s last failed keeper before the Dutchman.
            
Van der Sar might have continued for even longer but for his wife’s brain hemorrhage in 2009. She has recovered well but needs regular treatment in the Netherlands. Asked when he decided to quit, he said: "Let's just say that it was playing on my mind from the moment Annemarie had her stroke." He’s now planning a stint as house-husband -- preferably after pocketing the double of league title and Champions League.
           
Anyway, he couldn’t go on forever (could he?). "He made the point himself. It is pointless trying to be Superman into your forties," reports Ferguson. Under the showers at work one day, Wayne Rooney lobbied the keeper to continue, but to no avail. It was left to another teammate, Rio Ferdinand, to deliver the encomium. "He’s changed my thinking when it comes to goalkeepers,” said the center-back. “If I ever become a manager, I’ll be looking for my goalkeeper to exhibit as many of Edwin’s traits as possible." And so says everyone in football.

How To Win Penalty Shootouts

  • What You Need To Know
  • Statistics can be used to accurately predict the result of penalty shots.
  • You stand a greater chance of winning if you take the first penalty
  • Few know about the statistical analysis of soccer, and it can be used for financial advantage.

The Importance Of Statistics             

Before telling the story about the final, I must declare an interest. Last year, I helped set up a consultancy, Soccernomics, which aims to bring data analysis to soccer. Soccernomics has a penalty guy. He’s Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, a professor at the London School of Economics. 
          
Palacios-Huerta played professional soccer in Spain’s third division and then began looking at penalties as a real-life case study of his field of expertise, game theory. He has studied over 9,000 penalties since 1995. During the last World Cup, he probably knew more about the tournament’s penalty-takers than all the teams there. Their ignorance amazed him, he told me over the phone from his native Basque country, where he was watching the games on TV in between bouts of childcare. After all, he said, “I have nothing at stake. They have lots: the whole nation.” Yet plans for penalties remains mostly primitive in most teams.
             
According to the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, before Japan’s shootout against Paraguay, the Japanese camp had information on only one Paraguayan penalty taker -- and I doubt the information was very reliable. Palacios-Huerta says you can’t just count a few penalties the player has taken. Perhaps you have five penalties in your database. The player hit two left, three right, and so you conclude that he tends to hit right. But maybe he hit one of them right because he spotted the keeper moving left. And what about the other 30 penalties he’s taken?
          
Palacios-Huerta thinks that even today’s most sophisticated teams just count the frequency of penalty-taker shoots and to the corner they're more often shot. “I would be super-surprised if they do any kind of statistical test,” he told me.

Crunching The Numbers Of Penalty Shootouts         

He runs two tests. The first is: Does a particular kicker follow a truly random strategy? If the kicker does, then the direction he chooses for his next kick -- right of the keeper, through the middle or left -- cannot be predicted from his previous kicks. A random kicker is like a man tossing an honest coin. Whether he throws heads or tails this time can't be predicted from his previous throws.
              
But people in real life rarely follow random strategies. They often fall into patterns, and Palacios-Huerta gets excited when he detects someone’s patterns. Real Madrid’s Gonzalo Higuain, for instance, kicks too often to the keeper’s right. Diego Forlan tends to hit each new penalty in the opposite corner from the previous one.

Shootout Patterns
In 2008, preparing a report for Chelsea before the Champions League final against Manchester United, Palacios-Huerta found that Cristiano Ronaldo always scores when the keeper moved before the kick. And when Ronaldo stopped in his run-up, he almost always shot right. That final went to a penalty shootout; Ronaldo stopped in his run-up; Chelsea’s keeper, Petr Cech, remained motionless; Ronaldo shot right; and Cech saved. 





Conversely, Palacios-Huerta found that United’s keeper, Edwin van der Sar, dived right too often. Chelsea’s first six penalty takers all shot to van der Sar’s left, and the keeper didn’t save a shot. But when Chelsea’s Nicolas Anelka took the decisive kick, van der Sar psyched him out by pointing to his left (meaning, “You’re all hitting it there, aren’t you?”). A frazzled Anelka hit right, van der Sar saved and United were European champions. (This is where words as a medium fail. I urge you to watch this shootout HERE.) Or picture below.










Next, Palacios-Huerta testws the kicker’s success rate with each strategy. The kicker should have an equally high scoring rate, whether he shoots right, middle or left. But going into the World Cup, both Argentina’s Sergio Aguero and Germany’s Miroslav Klose, for instance, were scoring more often when shooting right of the keeper. That would logically encourage them to hit their next kick right. As Ignacio says, all that matters is what the kicker will do next, not what he did in the past.

The Most Important Factor               
Individual habits are only a secondary matter, though. The key moment in any shootout occurs before it even starts. The referee tosses a coin, and the captain who calls correctly gets to decide whether his team takes the first kick. Always kick first, says Palacios-Huerta. The team taking the first penalty wins 60% of shootouts. That’s because the team going second shoots under great pressure. They keep having to score just to stay in the game. I was in the Pretoria stadium for Japan-Paraguay, and the moment Paraguay’s captain, Justo Villar, won the toss and chose to start, I logged onto a bookmaker’s website and tried to put money on Paraguay winning. The bookmaker refused me because of my location; it wasn’t taking bets placed in South Africa. Paraguay won the shootout.  
                        
Few seem to know this initial advantage exists, says Palacios-Huerta. TV commentators rarely even mention the toss. Bookmakers don’t shift their odds immediately after the toss is done -- a mistake from which gamblers could benefit. And at Euro 2008, Italy’s captain, Gianluigi Buffon, may have decided the outcome of the tournament when he won the toss for a shootout against Spain and let the Spaniards shoot first. They won, of course, and then won the tournament, Palacios-Huerta wasn't necessarily thrilled. (He has a Spanish passport, but like most Basques, he is a strong regionalist and not a huge fan of Spain.

Before an earlier knockout game in the World Cup, Soccernomics had supplied another European country with a report on its opponent's penalties. That match ended before a shootout, so the report wasn’t used. But earlier, when Holland reached the final, I had e-mailed a Dutch official I knew slightly. I grew up in Holland and support Holland. I explained what we could provide. Was the official interested? 
            
He was. Palacios-Huerta, who was perfectly willing to sabotage Spain, pulled two all-nighters. He finished the report on Saturday morning, July 10, the day before the final. At lunchtime on Sunday, someone inside Holland’s camp e-mailed us, writing, “It’s a report we can use perfectly.”

Applying The Stats
In Soccer City, with the game scoreless in extra time, I reread the report on my computer screen between Dutch yellow cards. It turned out that Spain was finishing the match with only one experienced penalty taker on the field, Fernando Torres. Its two most regular kickers, David Villa and Xabi Alonso, had been substituted. The Spaniards must have viewed the impending shootout with anxiety.
            
I checked our report’s findings on Torres. He had a slight tendency to kick to the keeper’s left, but critically, 76% of his shots were low. Sometimes Torres shot mid-height, but never high. Clearly Holland’s keeper, Maarten Stekelenburg, should go to ground fast against him.   
            
No other Spaniard still playing had any significant penalty-taking experience. But that fact itself was telling. Infrequent penalty kickers hit 70% of their kicks to their “natural” side: right of the keeper for right-footed kickers, left for left-footed ones. That’s the easiest way. Xavi and Iniesta were probably going to kick to Stekelenburg’s right.
               
As for Spain’s keeper Iker Casillas, over the 59 penalties that we observed him, he had a good side and a bad one. Kickers scored considerably more when kicking to their “non-natural” side against Casillas. Right-footers should therefore aim to his left, and left-footers to his right. And, of course, Palacios-Huerta said that if Holland won the toss, it must shoot first.
                  
Interestingly, Stekelenburg said about the hypothetical shootout, “I was convinced we would go on to win.” Though it didn’t happen, the experience underlined soccer’s embrace of data. The sport will probably never be as data-driven as baseball, but it is moving that way. Earlier in the World CUp, when we had approached another European team offering our help, one of their several match analysts told us politely that they had an hour’s footage of each opposition’s penalties, plus a penalty database. A certain Latin American country, by contrast, was less informed.

Monday, 11 April 2011

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